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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At this point, we will not make a formal statement
of the fuct.s in this case, but will. discuss t~ facts under
our Poinrt II. We will first seek to establish that this
Court used an erroneous rule for appellate review in a
case where there was a verdict and judgment in favor of
plaintiff here. We will then seek to establish the rule
that should have been fo1lowed by this Court and based
upon thart rule, and a discusffion of the evidence most
favorable to plaintiff, we will seek to show that the Court
should ei.ither grant a rehearing or in the alternative to
affirm the verdict and judgment of the trial court.
POINT I.
THE COURT USED AN ERRONEOUS RULE
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW AND, IN FACT,
IT SHOULD HAVE USED THE RULE THAT
IT WOULD LOOK TO THE EVIDENCE
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT.
This Court started its opinion on a false premise and
worked from there to an erroneous conclusion. The Court
states:
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"Counsel reminds us that v.:e must re,·iew
the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict.
'Ve will do this by not reporting or considering the evidence adduced by defendant, but
only that of the plaintiff, and holding the
plaintiff responsible for any such evidence
representing both the less favorable to its contentions as well as that which may be more
favorable."
The first sentence pays lip service t,o the rule contended frn- by plainitiff. Even then it does not properly
st.ate the rule because it should be "in a light most favorable to the verdict."
The second sentence then states a rule which is entirely different from the rule contended for by us at the
time of the submission of this case and as of now.
The Court cites the case of Oberg v. Sanders, 111
Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229 (1947). This case in no way supports the rule which this Court elected t,o follow in its
considel"aition of this case on appeal. In the Oberg case,
the trial court granted a Motion for a non-suit. The
Cour.t stated:
"The question for determination in this
case is whether the trial court erred in granting the motion for nonsuit. To decide this question we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to plaintiff."
This case did not hold that it would take into consideration the less favorable evidence against plaintiff's
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position as this Court st.at.eel it was going to do in this
case.

The Oberg case also made reference to the rule concerning weighing of testimony in connection with crossexamination which has no relevancy here. In connection
with that rule the Court stated as follows:
1

"The rule is that the testimony of a witness is no stronger than where it is left on
cross-examination.''
Apparently the Court takes the view in considering
this oase that the plainrtiff, by calling a witness, vouches
for all of his testimony and is bound by it. This just is
not the rule as was pointed out by this Court in the case
of Schl.atter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196 P.2d 968
( 1948) . In that case, the plaintiff called two witnesses.
One by the name of Jones who testified in one aspect
favorably to plaintiff and in another aspect unfavorably.
Another witness was called by plaintiff who testified
favorably on the subject Jones had testified unfavorably.
Plain1Jiff's counsel made the argument that Jones should
be disbeJ.Iieved and that the testimony of the other witness
shouJd be followed in connection with his favorable testimony. In addressing itself to this question, this Court
stated as follows:
"It is the general rule that a party who calls
a witness vouches for his veracity, and cannot
afterward impeach the witness, either by the
testimony of impeaching witnesses or by argu-
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ment to the jury. The rule is s uh j e ct
to some exceptions, notably where one
party must call the adverse p a rt y as a
witness. But a party is not bound by every
statement that his witness makes, and he may,
be testimony of other witnesses and in argument to the jury, show that the facts were different from those testified to by the witness.
This is permitted, not for the purpose of impeaching the witness (although it may have
that incidental effect) , but for establishing the
true facts. It would be a monstrous rule that
would bind a party to every statement of every
witness produced by him. It is common experience that several eye-witnesses to an occurrence will have different versions of the same
transaction. A party who calls several eyewitnesses is entitled to argue before the jury
that they should believe the facts to be as testified to by the witness most favorable to him.
This is not an attack upon the veracity of the
other witnesses called by him whose testimony
may be different in some respects from that
of others, but merely an attempt to convince
the jury that the facts are really as contended
by him. On the other hand, a party who has
called a witness to help prove his case, and has
vouched for his credibility, may not thereafter
argue to the jury that such witness is unworthy of belief."
Within the meaning of this case, the argument by a
party that the most favorable testimony should be mken
by the jury to establish his case is not an attack on the
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basis that the witness who testified differently than this
is unworthy of belief.
The principle of the Schl.atter case was reaffirmed
by this Court as late as November, 1972 in the oase of
Batt v. State, 28 Utah2d 417, 503 P.2d 855 (1972). In
that case, this Court stated:
"However, we note here that we are in
accord with the idea that a party neither has
to vouch for, nor be bound by, the testimony
of a person whom he calls as a witness."
The Court also cited Rule 20 of the Rules of Evidence of Utah. That rule provides:
"Rule 20.
Credibility.

Evidence Generally Affecting

Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility
of a witness, any party including the party
calling him may examine him and introduce
extrinsic evidence concerning any statement
or conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issue of credibility."
The rule whloh should have been followed by this
Court has been stated innumerable times. We will not
attempt to make an exhaustive review of these cases but
will only cite the more recent oases whl.~h have followed
the rule.

In Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Company, 106
U. 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1'944) on a trial before the lower
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court, without a Jury, the Court entered a judgment of
no cause of action. The Court stated the following as the
rule to be followed in the appellate review of this case:
"This is a case at law. It therefore follows that
this appeal is upon question of law alone. That
being true the function of this court is not to
pass upon the weight of the evidence, nor to
determine conflicts therein, but to examine it
solely for the purpose of determining whether
or not the judgment finds substantial support
in the evidence. In so examining the evidence
all reasonable presumptions are in favor of the
trial court's findings and judgment, and the
evidence must be considered in the light most
favorable to them. If the findings and judgment are substantially supported by the evidence, then the court may not disturb them."

In Toomer's Estate v. Unum Pacific Railroad Co.,
121 U. 37, 239 P.2d 163 (1951) a verdict in a railroad
crossing case was for plaintiff and in affirming plaintiff's
judgment, the Court stated the rule for appellate review
as follows:
"The jury, having found the issues in
favor of the plaintiff, he is entitled to have us
consider all of the evidence, and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom
in the light most favorable to him. See Lewis
v. Rio Grande TVestern Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483,
123 P. 97; Cromeenes v. San Pedro. L.A. &
L. R. Co., 37 Utah 475, 109 P. 10 and see
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1Vicc v. Illhwis Cent. R. Co., 303 Ill. App.
:Z!J~. 25 N .E.2d 104."
In Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Consolidated
Freightways, et a/,., 121 Utah 379, 242 P.2d 563 (1952)
the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff and the
Court stated that the one question of substance to be
decided on appeal was whether the record supported the
finding of the trial court that plaintiff's damage was
caused by the negligence of the defendant. The Court
stated the rule as follows:
"This assignment of error requires merely
that we examine the record in the aspects most
favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether
there is evidence to support the judgment of
the court below. Beagley v. U. S. Gypsum
Company, Utah, 23.5 P.2d 783, and cases there
cited."
In Gibbons and Reed v. Guthrie, 123 U. 172, 256 P.2d
706, (1953), this Court, in supporting a trial court judgment, stated the rule as follows:
"It needs no citation of authority that this
Court will not redetermine facts found by the
fact finder in the lower court in law cases if in
the light most favorable to the respondent the
evidence is sufficient to sustain such findings."

In Niemann v. Grand Central Market, lru:., 9 U.2d
46, 337 P.2d 424 (1959) again in supporting the judgment of the trial court, this Court stated the rule as follows:
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"It is well settled in the law that sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, in
a law action, must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. It is equally
clear that the examination of an appellate
court is limited to the question of whether there
is substantial evidence upon which the jury
could have based its verdict. In our judicial
system the jury is the trier of fact, their determination of fact, based on face to face contact with each witness and on a first-hand appraisal of the evidence, must be given full consideration. The finding of a jury will be upset
only when it is clearly not supported by substantial evidence."

In Dansak v. Deluke, 12 U.2d 302, 366 P.2d 67 (1961),
the Court applied the following rule in affirming a trial
court judgment:
"This being a case at law it follows that
this appeal is upon questions of law alone.
This court cannot pass upon the weight of the
evidence, nor determine conflicts therein, but
can only determine whether or not the findings
and judgment of the trial court find substantial support in the evidence. In so examining
the evidence, all reasonable presumptions are in
favor of such findings and judgment, and the
evidence must be considered in the light most
favorable to them."
In some cases the Court has not used the words "most
favorable" but never, so fiar as we can determine, has it
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ever used the rule above quoted from the Elton case.
These other cases have stated that if the evidence is sufficient to support the ve~diot or judgment the trial court
must be affirmed.
In Lym v. Tlwmpson, 112 U. 24, 184 P.2d 667 (1947)
this Court started the rule of appellate review as follows:
""\Ve are called upon to decide whether
or not there is evidence in the case that will directly or by inference support the decision of
the trier of the facts. In deciding that question
we decide merely-so far as circumstantial evidence is concerned-that if there are inferences
to be drawn therefrom that will support the
lower court's conclusions upon the probabilities of that evidence, we are bound to uphold
the decision, even though had we been trying
the case we might have stressed the inferences
adversely to such a conclusion. We have shown
above how there are inferences that will support the lower court's conclusion and therefore
we must affirm it. It is so ordered."
The Court, in the Elton case, flew right in the face
of the rule as stated in the Lym case.
In Horsky v. Robinson, 112 U. 227, 186 P.2d 592
(1947) this Court held that it was a constitutional duty
whioh thris Court had in reviewing a law case and stated:
"Under a general verdict we cannot be assured what facts the jury found or that they
found the facts necessary to sustain their
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Finally, Mrs. Elton's summation of his working hours
(R. 313) was stated as follows:

"A. Well, he did, but I mean the way I was
able to observe my husband, it was because I
know he had his regular duties in Court, he had
-he was-he had this Ronnow, this Sunday
Closing was sort of overlapping in preparing,
and he spent every single minute studying.
Like I said, even Sundays, Saturdays and
Sundays. And this involved the whole family.
It was just plain miserable. And I could see
he was building up this pressure. And I toldthere was nothing I could do about it. But
this is what I feel was it just came to a
climax."
From the foregoing evidence, certainly the jury was
justified in finding that Judge Elton, in the last six weeks
of his life, was under marked physical and emotional
stress.
Turning now to the medical evidence most favorable
t.o the plaintiff, we call the Courtt's attention, again, to
plam1liff's Exhlbit 6 which the Court entirely disregarded
in its Opinion and in which the opinion of Dr. Null, and
the other doctors, was to the effect that the marked physical and emotional stress indeed precipitated the decedent's death. This evidence alone is enough to justify the
jury verdict and, in our opinion, is the evidence most
favorable to the plaintiff's JX>Siltion in ,this case.
However, a review of the medical evidence produced
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by plaintiff requires, under what we consider well established rules of Utah law, affinnance of the judgment below.
Dr. Robert M. Dalrymple was Judge Elton's treafutg
physician. Judge Elton had suffered his first stroke on
January 9, 1969 (R. 319) but, under the evidence, the
jury in this case could well have found that by April 21,
1970, he had recovered. We will attempt to show this
by a reference to Dr. Dalrymple's testimony.
Dr. Dalrymple saw the Judge on Ap:ril 1, 1969 and
at that time he had returned to work although he could
not say he had returned to fuH time work (R. 323). Dr.
Dalrymple saw the Judge in May, June, July, August~
September and October, 1969 (R. 323). He stated that
he continued to improve during that time and on October
3, 1969, he was doing a full day's work (R. 324). Dr.
Dalrymple continued t.o see him through April 20, 1970.
He stated that on February 23, 1970, he was doing well
and that on March 23, 1970, "everything was satisfactory,
no change" (R. 324 and 325). On April 20, 1970 his medicine was reduced "because he was doing quilfie satisfuct.orily" (R. 325).

It must be remembered it was during this latter period of time that, according to the foregoing testimony, the
Judge was under a great deal of physical and emolfliomtl
stress because of the work he was doing and the burden
of the sensitive cases he was deciding. From this date
on, it was all downhiU where before this time his progress had been uphill.

23
The jury could well have found, and this Court
should sustain iit, that the stresses and the strains were
what caused the ensuing physioa.l deterioration of Judge
Elton.
Judge Elton was brought intx> Dr. Dalrymple's office
on April 21, 1970 by his wife in such a condition that he
assumed the Judge had had another stroke (R. 325). On
April 28, 1970, he had another episode wmoh the dootor
described as "not good" (R. 326). He then saw the Judge
again on May 2, 1970 and, concerning his condition, he
testified as follows:
"Q. Did you know anything about the work
load that he was assuming during this period
of time?

A. All I knew about it was that he had been
working hard. I had suggested he cut down,
but he was a very impulsive individual, and
he would not listen very well.
Q. Did you know anything about these cases,
the name of them, the Sunday Closing Law or
have any knowledge of those?

A. I had heard rumors of them, sir, but they
didn't mean much to me.
Q. During this period of time, did you form
an opinion as to whether or not he was suffering under some stress?

A. Oh, I don't think there was any doubt
about it, sir." (R. 327).
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We, again, call the Court's attention to plaffitiff's
Exhibit 6 wherein it was the opinion of Dr. Null that this
physical and emotional stress, from which Judge Elton
was suffering, precipitated his death. How, in the face
of this evidence, can this Court overrule the jury's finding
that it was stress toot was the proximate cause of the
death of Judge Elum? That is what this testimony means
and this is the finding this testimony supports.
The Judge died on May 13, 1970 and DT. Dalrymple
testified that the immediate cause of death was circulatory collapse. This, in tum, was due to damage of the
brain, in other words, "all his reflexes went to pot and
he collapsed" (R. 329). Dr. Dalrymple further testified:

"* * *

I would just
opinion that this man
and something drove
he was under servere

have to say in my own
was well and doing well,
him to pot, and I think
stress." ( R. 331).

Here again we pause to have the CoUTt reflect upon
this evidence and answer the question, how in the world
can this Court find, in view of this testimony, that the
finding of the jury toot the stress was the sole cause of
the death of Judge Elton on May 13, 1970 was not justified by the evidence.
At this point, we call the Court's attention to the
case of White v. Natwnal Postal Transport Association,
1 U.2d 5, 261 P.2d 924 (1953), in which, in a very similar
si tuation, the Court held that it was proper to submit to
the jury whether or not the decedent had died from an
1
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accident defined as sudden, violent death from an external violent and accideilltal means resulting directly, independellltly and exclusively from any other causes. The
Court stated:
"At the trial respondent proceeded on the
theory that the accidental blow to White's leg
(I) reactivated or "lighted up" an inactive
heart condition which led to his death, or ( 2)
the blow started an unbroken chain of circumstances which led to his death independently of any contributing cause. Instructions embracing these two theories were presented to
the jury and it is the giving of those instructions which is assigned as error by the appellant who contends that the respondent failed
to adduce evidence to support a jury finding
under either theory."
In that case, the prior oondition had reached a sintionary period and the Court held it was proper to submirt that case on both of the theories indicated in the
foregoing quotation.
Dr. Dalrymple testified that Judge Elton was under
undue stress and he did not think he was going to die
that fast (R. 332) .
Tills Court was totally wrong in saying that Judge
Eltxm suffered from a lingering progressive heart disease.
Dr. Dalrymple testified oontrary to the Court's statement
when he ,testified "He (Judge Elton) had no heart trouble until he died" (R. 345) .
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On the question of the unexpectedness of JudgE
Elron's death, Dr. Dalrymple testified in his deposition
as follows:

"* * * were you suprised by this development
in a medical sense?
A. In a way, yes. He was doing so well, I
really was quite shocked that he had this sud<len* * *." (R. 358).
He further testified:
"A. As I said before, sir, the only thing is if
one person has a stroke, they are always suspicious they will have another, but people live a
long period of time and never have another
stroke. I was just being extra cautious and
trying to do some preventative medicine rather
than treating him by the observation. I had no
assurance that Mr. Elton was going to have
another stroke." (R. 359).
The hospital records of May 13, 1970 (Exhibit 3-P)
further support the jury's verdict by the following quotation:
"Patient has been followed by myself since
that time and has had some weakness and headache for the past two weeks which have been
associated with considerable emotional stress
due to his work as a jurist.
Approximately 2 hours before admission patient had rather sudden onset of weakness and
cyanosis and was immediately brought to the
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hospital by ambulance. There is no history of
recent chest pain, hemoptysis or dyspnea."
The favorable testimony of Dr. Clyde Null also supports the jury verdiot and this Court should look at this
testimony favorably and we are sure, if it does, that it
will conclude that the jury verdict was suported by sufficienrt evidence.
Dr. Null described the stroke in January, 1969, and
which apparently was the same as the one of May 13,
1970, as a "cerebral cardiovascular accident" (R. 370).
Dr. Null testified as follows on cross-examination
when counsel was seeking to get the dootor to testify
that Judge Elton was going 1;o die from the progression
of his condition:

"Q. And when you-when the condition gets
so bad-I mean eventually this person, as the
condition progresses, is going to die from the
progression of this condition?
A. That's not really necessarily true, sir. It
is a common clinical observation that we cannot always-we simply can't answer all of
these in that fashion. People will have a stroke,
they will have symptoms of vascular insufficiency and this will go on for years, and others
do not. And there are a whole host of factors
which influence that." ( R. 383) .

We respectfully submit that if the Court will follow
the rule limiting its appellate review as indicated by the
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cases heretofore cited, we are satisfied that no other conclusion can be reached than that the evidence supported
the finding by the jury that there was a bodily injury
defined by the doctors as a cerebral cariovascular accident and that the stress, which Judge Elton was under
by virtue of his judicial duties~ was the proximate precipitating cause of his death.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
A PRE-EXISTING DISEASE WOULD PREVENT RECOVERY UNDER THIS POLICY
OF INSURANCE.
Respondent's position, in filing her Brief in this matter, was to meet the arguments and the theories set forth
by appellant in claiming that error had been committed.
In this regard, it is respectfully suggested that the respondent did meet the appellant's theory. But, more
importantly and critical 1;o the issue in this case, is the
faot that the cases relied upon by the Court, in reversing
the jury verdiot, were not mentioned by the appellant
in his Brief. The Court relied upon the following cases:
Smith v. Continental Casualty Com'{X1ny, Dist. of Col.
CT. App., 203 A.2d 168 (1964), Bewley v. American
Home Assurance, 450 F.2d 1079 (1971), Love v. American Casualty Company, 202 F.Supp. 47 (1961), Landress
v. P00enix Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 54 S.Ct. 461, 78 L.Ed.
934 (1934), Mutual Benefit v. Hudman, 398 S.W.2d 110
(1965).
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As was stated, these cases were not cited by appellant and, as such, a Petition for Rehearing should be
granted in all fairness to allow respondent to reply to the
effect of these cases. This is particularly important in
this instance since the cases cited by the Court sustain
a view that has been specifically rejected by numerous
Utah cases.
In Smith v. American Casualty Company, supra, but,
more importantly, in Bewley v. American Home Assurance, supra, the appellate courts took the position that
the principle of proximate cause, applied ordinarily in
negligence cases, does not apply in construing insurance
liability cases. That is, these cases hold that if there is
any concurrence of accidental injury or pre-existing bodily infirmity or disease, that it is "irrelevant whether the
bodily infirmity or disease is a proximate oause of death
or the remote cause, because recovery on the policy is
precluded merely if the infirmity or disease is a contributing cause of death."
This Court cites Mutual Benefit v. Hudman, supra,
where there was no evidence that the accident did preoipiJtarte the decedent's death. It appears, however, that
the construction, put by this Court on this case, is erroneous because a later case from the same jurisdiotiion,
Mutual Benefit v. Ratliff, 440 S.W.2d 119, stated wirth
regard to the issue of causation:
"The Court clearly states in Hudman that
they were not holding that every pre-existing
frailty or enfeeblement of the human body
which exists at the time of an accident will de-
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feat recovery under policies similar to the one
invoh'ed in Hudman. The Court cites with approval Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insnrance Company, 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914
( 1930) in which Chief Justice Cardozo said:
" 'A policy of insurance is not accepted
with the thought that its coverage is to be restricted to an Apollo or a Hercules.'
Competent evidence of qualified persons
separated the real causes of Mr. Ratliff's death
from mere conditions thereby raising issues of
fact which the Court has found against Appellant. Appellant's no evidence points are overruled.''

As mentioned earlier, Utah does not follow this strict
rule of sole cause but, rather, has, on numerous occasions,
refuted such narrow construction. See Whitlock v. Old
American Insurance Company, 21 U.2d 131, 442 P.2d 26
(1968). The Court stated as follows:
"It is appreciated that insurance companies in issuing these accident policies make
perfectly legitimate efforts to so word them
as to exclude death caused by disease and to
cover only death caused by accident. N otwithstanding differences in wording in attempting
to accomplish that objective, it is generally
held that insofar as coverage for accident is
concerned, the insurer takes the insured as he
is; that even though he may have some diseased
condition which would eventually result in his
death, or that the injury would not have resulted in death to a more robust person, if an
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accident occurs which hw;tcns his death, recovery can be had under the policy. The critical question to be determined is whether the
real and efficient cause, or as sometimes stated,
the proximate cause of death was the disease,
or the accident 1 , and where the evidence would
reasonably permit a finding either way, the
issue is for the jury." (Emphasis added).
(Footnote 7 is as follows:

Hassing v. JJJutual Life Ins. Co., 108 Utah
198, 159 P.2d 117 ( 1945) and cases cited therein; Fetter v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 174 Mo.
256, 73 S.W. 592, 61 L.R.A. 459 (1903);
Kundiger v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
219 Minn. 25, 17 N.W.2d 49 (1944). See also
DiEnes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 21 Utah2d
147' 442 p .2d 468 ( 1968) . )
1

After making the foregoing statement; that is, that
the central issue involves the question of proximate cause,
the Court spooifically adopted the holdings of two oases
that involve fact situations almost identical with the facts
in this case.
"A case supporting this view which is close to
our own on its facts is Brooks v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., 27 Cal.2d 305, 163 P.2d
689 ( 1943). Even though the deceased had had
incurable cancer the Court stated that the presence of such a pre-existing disease would not
relieve the insurer from liability if the accident
was the prime or moving cause of the death.
In Gennari v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
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Jiu. (1!.>60), 335 S.\V.2d

55, the defendant

company claimed that the death was caused by
a prior condition of hypertensive cardiovascular disease and arteriosclerosis. 'The Court
stated that "'It is well settled that although a
person may have a weakened body*** as the
result of * * * disease nonetheless if death is
directly caused by * * * accidental means * * *
recovery may be had * * * if he dies by reason
of it, even if he would not have died if his previous health had been different. In such event
the condition of previous health is merely a
predisposing and remote cause and not the
direct, proximate cause, as contemplated by the
policy, notwithstanding such condition ,might
have cooperated, concurred in and contributed
to death'." (Emphasis added).

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE WORD "ACCIDENT" IN AN INSURANCE POLICY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
DIFFERENTLY FROM THE WORD "ACCIDENT" IN A WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION OR RETIREMENT STATUTE.
The word "accident" is
the English language. Just
eDJt meaning one place than
derstand. An accident is an

in common every day use in
why it should have a differanother is really hard to unaccident.

This Court has held that stress and strain constitutes
an accident under the very same facts as were presented
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t.o the Court and jury in the case at bar. Elton v. Utah
Retirement Board, 28 U.2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972) in
wmch the Court stated that it had heret;ofore held:

"* * * that

an internal failure brought about
by exertion in the course of employment may
be an accident within the meaning of the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act. Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah2d 140, 427 P.2d
740 (1967). The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act employs language identical to that
found in the Judges Retirement Act above
quoted."

Testimony in the previous Elton case is as follows:
"The persons who knew him best-his wife, his
colleagues, his clerk, his baliff and the lawyers who practiced before him-all testified to
the deterioration of his health, brought upon
by the stresses of the highly sensitive cases
handled by him during the last six weeks of his
life. His physician testified that Judge Elton
suffered from vascular disease, resulting in insufficient blood supply to the brain, and that
this condition was aggravated by the stresses of
Judge Elton's employment and that these
stresses were the principal factor in cutting
short his Zife." (Emphasis added).
It then ruled as follows:
"The record supports the trial court's conclusion that Judge Elton died as a result of an
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at:cident arising out of or in the course of his
employment, and under the traditional rules
of review the judgment of that court will not
be disturbed. The judgment of the trial court
is affirmed, no costs a warded."

It is impossible to understand how this Court could

make the word "accident" have different meanings in
different areas of the law. This is simply not justified
on any logical basis, yet one of the interesting things
about the holding of the Court is that it is based on the
flat-out statement that there should be a distinction between Workmen's Compensation language and insurance
policy language. The Court does this without the citation of a single authority. We think for the Court to take
off on a new theory of law in the face of authority in this
state directly agamst this holding is, to say the leastt,
not in the highest tradition of the law.
We may OOlk all we want about the differences between statutes and insurance policies, but we always
must return to the simple fact that we are only construing a common every day word "accident" and iJt should
have the same meanling wherever used.
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Company, 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 (1921), it was expressly
held that "accident" should mean the same in an insurance policy as it later was construed to mean in staitutes.
In view of the fact that this Court has overruled. the
Richards case, it should not permit this ruling to be given
retroactive operation. As this Court points out, the mat-
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ter is contractual and the parties contracted at a time
that the Richards case was in effect and certainly could
rely upon that case as indicating what constituted an
accident within the meaning of the policy issued to Judge
Elton. The law is to the effect that in such a situation,
the overruling authority should not be given retroactive
enforcement. See Williams v. Utah State Depar.tment
of Finances, 23 U.2d 438, 464 P.2d 596 (1970), and Draper
v. Travelers Insurance Company, 429 F.2d 44 (1970) (10
CCA), 10 ALR3rd 1371.
These same authorities apply to the Whitlock case,
supra, wmch has, we submit, been overruled by this Court
in the Elton case. Whether or not this should have retroactive effect, should be considered at length by the Court
on rehearing.
Because of the action of the Court, these issues were
not presented to the Court at the time of the filing of
the Briefs and arguing.
We certainly believe that this matter should be considered by the Court for the first time on a rehearing.
Also, along this line, the Court again makes what we
believe to be a misstatement. It states "by and large the
authorities cited by plamtiff are Workmen's Compensation cases." This just simply is not true. There are 12
insurance cases cited as against 5 Workmen's Compensation and Retirement cases.
Why, in all fairness, does the Court make this statement?
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CONCLUSION
We wonder whaJt happened to the analogy to tlUs
case made by a member of the Court presenting the question of a hemophiliac cutting his finger and dying which
he would not have done except for the hemophilia.
In such a situation, the member of the Court indicated that certainly the cutting of the finger would be
the sole cause of death.
Under the foregoing arguments and authoriitiies, we
submiit that the Court should reverse itseH and affirm
the verdict and judgment of the triaJ. court, or at a minimum, should grant a rehearing so the matters set forth
herein could be presented to the Court, some of them for
the first time.
Respeotfully submitted,
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